System average rates of U.S. investor-owned electric utilities : a statistical benchmark study by Berndt, Ernst R. et al.
System Average Rates of U.S. Investor-Owned
Electric Utilities: A Statistical Benchmark Study
by
Ernst R. Berndt, Roy Epstein, and Michael Doane
MIT-CEEPR 95-005WP June 1995
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
E•LP 5 1996
LURAR!ES
SYSTEM AVERAGE RATES OF U.S. INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES:
A STATISTICAL BENCHMARK STUDY*
by
Ernst R. Berndt, MIT Sloan School of Management
Roy Epstein, Analysis Group, Inc.
Michael Doane, Analysis Group, Inc.
Authors' Addresses:
Ernst R. Berndt
MIT Sloan School of
Management
50 Memorial Dr., E52-452
Cambridge, MA 02142
617-253-2665
Roy Epstein
Analysis Group, Inc.
1 Brattle Square,
Fifth Floor
Cambridge, MA 02138
617-349-2179
Michael Doane
Analysis Group, Inc.
100 Bush St., Suite 900
San Francisco, CA 94104
415-391-6100
*Financial support from San Diego Gas & Electric Company is gratefully
acknowledged, as is the superb research assistance of Laurits R. Christensen
of Analysis Group, Inc. We also acknowledge helpful comments from Robert Dye,
Dr. Larry Schelhorse, and Michael Schneider of San Diego Gas & Electric
Company. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of
the authors, and do not necessarily reflect positions of San Diego Gas &
Electric Company.
DOCUMENT NAME: ENERGY.JNL DOCUMENT DATE: 8 JUNE 1995

SYSTEM AVERAGE RATES OF U.S. INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES:
A STATISTICAL BENCHMARK STUDY
I. INTRODUCTION
Due largely to the fact that they are regulated by public utility
commissions, rates charged by electric utilities are often the focus of
intense public scrutiny. Controversies in rate hearings surrounding
differences in average rates charged residential, commercial and industrial
customers have a long history, but in recent years increasing attention has
focussed on "bottom line" differences across utilities in their overall system
average rates (SARs, revenue per Kwh). Proposals to restructure electric
utilities by, for example, deregulating the generation function and placing
the remaining transmission and distribution functions under some form of
performance-based regulation, or imposing some form of price controls, have
heightened interest in understanding what factors contribute to variations
across utilities in their SARs. State utilities commissions are therefore
examining more closely differences in SARs charged by the various within-state
utilities under their jurisdiction, as well as differences in comparison to
out-of-state utilities.
The research reported in this paper emerged from issues brought before
the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). California SARs are among
the highest in the US. In 1984, for example, the real (inflation-adjusted)
SAR for San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE),
and Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) ranked 3, 12 and 24 in comparison with 96
other large investor-owned US electric utilities; a decade later, in 1993, the
respective rankings were 17, 8 and 9. Why are SARs in California so high?
Why are they so much higher than the SARs of, say, Puget Sound Power and
Light, Montana Power Company, Appalachian Power Company, and Idaho Power
Company? Do the high California rates reflect factors largely beyond the
control of utility management, such as the unavailability of low-cost
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generation sources like hydro power and coal; the high local costs of doing
business such as franchise fees, state and local taxes, and state wage rates;
greater regulation-imposed costs such as required conservation and favored
purchasing mandates; or do the high California rates reflect inefficient
management and waste? Understanding why it is that California's SARs are so
high is an essential input in evaluating the likely consequences of
alternative deregulation and price control policy initiatives.
In this paper we report results of a statistical benchmark study
comparing the annual SARs of 99 investor-owned US utilities over the ten-year
time period, 1984-93.1 Our results are based on a statistical model relating
SARs to regional, economic, and regulatory factors largely beyond the control
of utility management, as well as to the effects of management. Following a
tradition originally used in the agricultural economics literature that
focused on estimating production function parameters free of management bias,
we incorporate the effects of management decisions by specifying an error
components model. Using a variety of estimation procedures and data from 99
utilities for up to ten years each, we obtain a surprisingly robust set of
results. Specifically, we find that the SARs of electric utilities are
significantly affected by various regional, economic and regulatory factors.
Controlling for these factors, there is no statistically significant
difference between the SARs charged by the three California utilities and the
national average. Thus, inferences concerning management efficiency made on
the basis of using unadjusted SARs can provide very misleading implications.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section II we consider
measurement and data issues. In Section III we develop our econometric model,
and devote particular attention to the error component stochastic
specification. Since our data set consists of an unbalanced panel (not all
utilities have all data available in each of the ten years), we also consider
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computational issues and alternative estimation procedures. In Section IV we
present econometric results, and in Section V we discuss implications of the
empirical findings. In Section VI we summarize the analysis and offer some
conclusions.
II. MEASUREMENT ISSUES AND DATA SOURCES
We require a sample of investor-owned utilities large enough to yield a
statistically reliable benchmark, but with the provision that the utilities be
reasonably comparable to those in California. Thus we selected investor-owned
utilities that met four criteria: (i) retail sales greater than zero;
(ii) residential sales at least 5% of total (retail and wholesale) sales;
(iii) generation plant at least 5% of total plant; and (iv) data reported for
all variables relevant to our analysis. These criteria generated suitable
1984-93 annual data for a total of 99 investor-owned utilities.2 Because
utilities differ in the completeness of their reported data, a company could
be included in some years and excluded in others. Our data set therefore
consists of an unbalanced panel, with utilities appearing in as few as one
year and as many as ten; the "average" utility appears in the sample 8.87
years.
Our bottom line benchmark criterion is the system average rate (SAR).
SAR is traditionally defined as total revenues from ultimate consumers divided
by total sales in Kwh to ultimate consumers. To account for differential
inflation rates by region, we deflate this SAR in nominal dollar quantities to
1993 constant dollars using the US Bureau of Labor Statistics regional all-
items Consumer Price Index (CPI).3
Substantial variation in SARs occurs in our sample. In 1993, for
example, the SAR ranged from 3.76 cents (Idaho Power) to 14.71 cents (Long
Island Lighting Co.). In general, there is more SAR variation between
utilities than there is within utilities over time; the ratio of the between-
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to within-utility sample variance is 5.63, implying that about 85% of the
sample variation in SAR is due to differences across utilities.
One major problem in comparing SAR across utilities is that the
utilities differ in taxes paid and in the regulatory costs directly imposed on
them. As a first step in moving toward more meaningful comparisons across
utilities over time, we net out the following factors from the total revenues
of each utility on a dollar-for-dollar basis: (i) franchisee fees (payments to
cities and counties for the right to use or occupy public streets, roads and
ways); (ii) state and local tax payments4 ; (iii) demand-side management
expenditures; (iv) the excess burden of qualifying facility (QF) power
purchases, defined as the amount by which QF payments exceed the cost that
would be incurred to obtain the same amount of QF power through own generation
by the utility and power purchases from other generating sources; and (v)
California regulatory adjustments due principally to the Energy Cost
Adjustment Clause mechanism, which adjusts annually for differences between
actual and forecast fuel and purchased power expenses. We then define a net
system average rate (NSAR) as total net revenues from ultimate customers with
the above "taxes" removed, divided by Kwh to ultimate customers.
It is worth noting that use of NSAR rather than SAR does not change much
the rankings of California utilities relative to others in the US. For
example, in 1984, based on NSAR, SDG&E ranked second highest in the US, SCE
was 12th, and PG&E was 22nd; by 1993, the respective rankings were 10, 28 and
14. However, using NSAR rather than SAR results in reducing the total sample
variance by about 25%, with most of the reduction being between rather than
within utilities; the ratio of the between to within variance of NSAR is 3.59,
implying that about 78% of the sample variance is across utilities. In 1993,
Long Island Lighting Company had the highest NSAR at 12.16 cents, while Idaho
Power had the lowest at 3.25 cents.
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The unadjusted NSAR, however, still embodies the effects of numerous
differences across utilities, many of which are outside the control of utility
management. We posit that five sets of factors affect NSAR, and now briefly
discuss each in turn.
First, local costs of doing business vary across utilities and over
time. Although the NSAR nets out inter-utility variations in franchise fees
and state and local taxes, it does not control for varying costs of labor. To
allow for this factor, we have collected data on state wage rates. We find
that on average, California wage rates are about 13% higher than the national
average.
Second, power production characteristics should affect costs and
therefore NSAR. As seen in Table 1, California utilities have negligible coal
and oil generation capacity, whereas for the rest of the nation, coal and oil
together account for 60% of capacity.5 Gas capacity averages about 14%
nationally, but is over 50% for the three Califoria utilities. Nuclear power
is also used more intensively in California than in the rest of the nation.
Next we posit that the average age of a utility system affects NSAR. Because
of inflation, gross plant and depreciation expenses are higher for newer
systems, thereby increasing a utility's ratebase and raising its NSAR, other
things equal. We measure average system age by dividing total accumulated
depreciation by total depreciation expense. The three California utilities
have an average age varying from 7.18 to 7.72, more than two years less than
the average age of 9.86 years for the rest of our sample. Further, we expect
costs of fuel and purchased power to affect NSAR. We compute the average cost
of fuel as the sum of fossil, nuclear and other fuel costs divided by net
generation. The average fuel price is 3.38 C/Kwh for SDG&E, 2.64 for SCE and
2.18 for PG&E, while the national average is 2.09. We also calculate the
average cost of utility purchased power as total expenditures for utility
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generated purchased power divided by megawatt hours purchased. SDG&E's
average price of utility purchased power is 4.86 C/Kwh compared to a rest of
nation average of 3.95, while that for SCE is 3.13 and PG&E is 2.74.
A third set of factors affecting NSARs comprises customer and service
territory factors. We expect that as use per customer declines, all else
equal, NSAR will increase because fixed costs will be spread over fewer sales.
The weather, customer mix and housing stock in California all contribute to
relatively low use per customer -- about one-half the national average. In
1984, for example, SDG&E ranked third, PG&E twelfth, and SCE fourteenth lowest
in the US in Kwh per customer; in 1993 the respective rankings were third,
seventh and ninth. Customer density -- the number of residential customers
per square mile -- may also influence costs. Given the added expense of
installing and maintaining complex distribution facilities and the higher
costs of obtaining right-of-ways, we expect that other things equal, urban
areas are more costly to serve. SCE and PG&E have much smaller customer
density than the national average (67 and 37 vs. 195), but that for SDG&E
(219) is slightly higher than the average. Customer composition, such as
residential customers as a percentage of total customers, can affect NSAR,
particularly when costs of distribution are large relative to transmission
services. 6 The size of this share for the three California utilities is
virtually the same as the national average -- 88%. A final customer and
service territory factor that can reasonably be expected to affect NSAR is the
system average load factor, calculated as the ratio of system average demand
to the system maximum or "peak" demand, both in megawatts. Since utilities
with lower load factors must allocate the cost of meeting peak demand across
fewer units, we expect that, ceteris paribus, system average load factor and
NSAR are negatively related. Load factors for the SDG&E and PG&E are close to
the national average (58% vs. 62%), but for SCE it is lower at 49%.
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A fourth set of factors affecting NSAR reflects the cost of complying
with local, state and federal regulations concerning pollution abatement
standards. To estimate the effects of air pollution regulations on NSAR, we
attempted to obtain data on the amount of nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide
generated by various types of generation units, in pounds per Mwh; our
expectation was that such air pollution emissions would be inversely related
to NSAR. Although we were successful in obtaining suitable measures for
sulfur dioxide, we were unable to obtain reliable data for nitrogen oxide.
Thus, we employ sulfur dioxide emissions as a proxy variable for the total
emissions generated by the various types of generation units, and the
percentage of capacity with sulfur control as a measure of the added cost of
pollution controls. While sulfur controls affect 11% of the rest of the
nation's generation capacity, for the three California utilities this share is
zero. Not surprisingly, therefore, sulfur emissions are much smaller -- .001
pounds/Kwh for SDG&E, .003 for SCE, .0002 for PG&E -- than the .016 for the
rest of the nation.
The fifth set of factors affecting NSAR consists of other regulatory
requirements, most of which reflect compliance with state utilities'
commissions. The effects of qualifying facility purchase requirements, as
well as demand side management expenditures, are already accounted for by use
of the NSAR rather than the "gross" SAR; QF excess burdens are especially
large for SCE (1.09¢/Kwh) and PG&E (0.87) relative to the national average of
0.08C/Kwh. Two other regulatory policies are of particular interest. The
CPUC requires California investor-owned electric and telephone utilities to
convert a portion of their overhead distribution lines to underground
facilities, thereby incurring costs to install underground facilities in
already-developed areas, and to remove existing overhead lines. Some local
governments, for example San Diego, require additional underground
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TABLE 1
VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE STATISTICAL BENCHMARK STUDY
Average Value, 1984-1993
Units SDG&E SCE PG&EVariable
Gross SAR
Net SAR
C/Kwh
C/Kwh
Local Costs of Doing Business
Franchise Fees
State & Local Taxes
State Wage Rates
Customer & Service Territory
C/Kwh
C/Kwh
$/Year
12.87
11.81
0.24
0.59
30,603
10.85
9.03
0.09
0.49
30,603
10.22
8.59
0.07
0.52
30,603
Other
National
7.95
7.08
0.004
0.73
26,755
Electricity Use Per Customer
Customer Density
System Load Factor
Share Residential Customers
Power Production Factors
Capacity Share - Coal
Capacity Share - Oil
Capacity Share - Gas
Capacity Share - Hydro
Capacity Share - Nuclear
Capacity Share - Other
Average Age of System
Average Fuel Price
Average Price of Utility
Purchased Power
Pollution Control Factors
Capacity Share with Sulfur
Controls
Sulfur Emissions
Kwh/Cust 12,811 17,250
Cust/Sq Mi 219 67
Percent 58 49
Percent 89 88
Percent
Percent
Percent
Percent
Percent
Percent
Years
C/Kwh
C/Kwh
Percent
Pounds/Kwh
0
7
59
0
20
14
7.18
3.38
4.86
0
.001
12
0
58
7
17
6
7.72
2.64
3.13
0
.003
Other Regulatorv Reouirements
Realized Rate of Return
QF Purchase Requirements
Demand Side Management
Expenditures
Percent Underground Distri-
bution Lines
Percent
C/Kwh
C/Kwh
11.03 10.46
0.10 1.09
0.13 0.15
Percent 50 54
16,681
37
58
87
0
0
51
26
13
11
7.61
2.18
2.74
0
.0002
25,564
195
62
88
50
10
14
6
11
9
9.86
2.09
3.95
11
.016
11.10
0.87
0.16
10.19
0.08
0.06
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distribution line conversion. We measure the effects of such regulatory
policies as the percent of total cable miles that is underground. While this
percent is 22% for the rest of the nation, for SDG&E it is 50% and for SCE it
is 54%. Finally, in rate case proceedings regulated utilities are assigned an
allowed rate of return. Ceteris paribus, it is reasonable to expect that the
greater the allowed rate of return, the higher the NSAR. Data on allowed rate
of return were not available, but data on average realized rates of return for
the three California utilities suggest allowed rates of return slightly above
the national average -- 11.03% for SDG&E, 10.46% for SCE, 11.10% for PG&E, and
10.19% for the rest of the nation.
The data sources used to construct the variables described above include
the Utility Data Institute's FERC Form 1 Database (containing annual financial
and other information filed at the FERC by major utilities), the Edison
Electric Institute's Electric Fuel Statistics (monthly data on the costs and
quality of fuels used in electric plants), the Edison Electric Institute's
Uniform Statistical Reports (voluntary filings by utilities containing
information describing company operations), the US Bureau of Labor Statistics
(Consumer Price Indexes), and the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (wages and
employment by state).
In Table 1 we list the variables to be used in our econometric analysis,
and also provide sample means of these variables for the three California
utilities and for the remainder of our national sample.
III. SPECIFICATION OF THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL
We now proceed with a discussion of the specification of our econometric
model. We first discuss issues of functional form, next we consider how to
deal with those variables which might not be entirely exogenous to current
utility management, and then we elaborate on how management effects can be
incorporated using an error components stochastic specification that reflects
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a hybrid of fixed and random effect considerations. We consider alternative
procedures for estimating parameters in an error components framework, given
the fact that our panel data set is unbalanced, and that the maximum number of
times a utility is observed -- ten -- is rather small.
The dependent variable in our econometric model is the logarithm of the
NSAR -- hereafter denoted LNSAR (later we report results on use of NSAR rather
than its logarithmic transformation). We expect that relationships involving
some variables, for example, real state wage rates, use per customer, customer
density, real average fuel costs, real utility wholesale purchased power, and
system age are most likely to affect LNSAR in a proportional manner, and thus
we include as explanatory variables in our model the logarithmic transforma-
tions of these variables, which we denote as LRWAGE, LUPC, LCD, LRFUEL, LRWPP
and LAGE, respectively. Other explanatory variables are already in percent
form, and thus we include them without further transformation; these include
generation capacity shares for coal, oil, gas, hydro, nuclear and other
(largely, geothermal), named CAPC, CAPO, CAPG, CAPH, CAPN and CAPOTH),
respectively. 7 A realized rate of return variable (ROR) is also included, as
is a time trend.
While many of the explanatory variables are plausibly outside the
immediate control of utility management (e.g., state wage rates, generation
capacity, system age), several other variables might arguably reflect current
management influences. First, use per customer might reflect utility-specific
pricing and other conservation policies; to allow for this possibility, we
will report regression results with and without the LUPC variable
"instrumented", using the logarithm of weather cooling degree days as an
instrumental variable. A second possible endogenous variable is LRFUEL, the
utility real average fuel cost; here an appropriate instrumental variable is
the state-specific average fuel cost. The final variable that could reflect
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current management influence is the rate of return measure. In principle, we
would prefer to employ an ex ante rate of return, since in rate hearings NSAR
is set so as to produce an expected rate of return. However, the ex ante rate
of return is unobservable. We explore two alternative ways of handling this
situation.
First, one feasible procedure involves formulating the relationship
between the ex post and ex ante rates of return (ROR) as follows. Let
RORex post - RORex ante + 6-shock + v (1)
where the ex post ROR is the sum of the allowed ex ante ROR plus factors that
"shock" this anticipated ROR, plus a random effect v. We postulate that the
shock is a function of the deviation of use per customer from trend, measured
as the residual from a utility-specific regression equation of LUPC on a time
counter. We then solve the above equation for the ex ante ROR in terms of the
ex post ROR and the demand shock, i.e.,
RORex ante - RORex post - 6*shock - v. (2)
We implement this formulation by including as regressors in the LNSAR equation
both the RORex post and the "shock" (deviation from trend) variable, which we
denote as DLUPC. Note that while we expect the coefficient on RORex post to
be positive, perhaps counterintuitively, this formulation implies that the
sign on the DLUPC variable should be negative.
A second possible procedure is to employ an instrumental variable, such
as the Moody bond rating for each of the utilities. However, it is not clear
how appropriate the Moody bond rating would be, for one could argue that
Moody's ratings reflect their judgment on utility management efficiency, and
thus the Moody rating would be a jointly determined rather than exogenous
variable. Nonetheless, in our empirical results, we will report findings
results on the use of Moody bond ratings as instruments.
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We now turn to issues of stochastic specification for our econometric
model, which we simply write as
yit - a + f'xit + uit (3)
where y is the dependent variable, there are K regressors in x in addition to
the constant term, i - 1,...,Nt, and t - 1,...,Ti (in our unbalanced panel,
not all utilities are observed in all years, thus Nt varies by year and Ti
varies over utilities), and a and the K #'s are unknown parameters to be
estimated.
With panel data, a common specification is that the mean zero random
disturbance term uit is the sum of a mean zero utility-specific component vi
that is constant over time, and an independent mean zero component Cit, with
the strictly positive variances of these two components being a2 and a2 8
For our purposes, the interpretation of vi is very important.9 One can
re-write (3) by substituting in the component error and gathering terms. This
gives us
yit - (a + vi) + f'xit + Cit (4)
where (a + vi) can be envisaged as a random intercept in the LNSAR equation
that varies across utilities. Since vi has mean zero, it reflects the
difference in LNSAR for utility i from the national average, ceteris paribus.
If vi is positive (negative), the LNSAR of utility i is larger (smaller) than
the national average, holding fixed the other factors (the x's) affecting
LNSAR. We postulate that that vi reflects the effects of management decisions
of utility i on its LNSAR; we recognize, however, that the effects of other
omitted variables might also be captured by vi.
If the vi's of the three California utilities -- SDG&E, PG&E and SCE --
were insignificantly different from zero, ceteris paribus, then in this
framework we would conclude that once one controls for the various regional,
economic and regulatory factors, the management effects of the three
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California utilities are no different from the national average. On the other
hand, if the vi's were found to be positive (negative) and significantly
different from zero, then one might infer that the management impacts of the
three California utilities result in a larger (smaller) NSAR than the national
average, having controlled for the various regional, economic and regulatory
factors.
With the above error components stochastic specification, the variance-
covariance matrix of disturbances is homoskedastic but non-diagonal (see, for
example, Greene [1993, ch. 16]). In particular, E(u t) - aU + a2 for
each i, but E(uituis) - a2 when s t. Under these assumptions, estimation of
parameters by ordinary least squares (OLS) is consistent but not efficient,
and traditional OLS-based estimates of the standard errors are biased.
Two methods have commonly been used to obtain consistent and efficient
estimates of a and P, and reliable estimates of their variances in this error
components specification; these are usually referred to as fixed and random
effects estimators. The random effects estimator employs a transformation
based on consistent (often, OLS) estimates of a2 and a2, denoted s2 and
s2, in which the x's and y are first transformed so that xj t  xijt -
Wixij for each of the regressors, and yit " yit - oiYi, where
2 -1/2
s 2 + T.s
2
L 1- [ 2:T 2 (5)
OLS is then performed on the transformed y* and x*, which now satisfy the
Gauss-Markov conditions for optimality of OLS. 10 In cases where the panel is
balanced (when Nt - N and Ti - T), and under the assumption of normality of
disturbances, iteration of this feasible generalized least squares procedure
has been shown to yield estimates that are numerically equivalent to maximum
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likelihood estimation.11 Although our panel is unbalanced, iteration is
feasible, and thus we iterate the transformation process until changes from
one iteration to the next are insignificant.
An alternative estimation procedure, known as fixed effects, replaces
the common intercept term a + vi (whose expected value is a) with utility-
specific constant terms ai for each i, and then employs OLS estimation. There
are four important facts to note about this fixed effects estimator.
First, it is well-known that employing OLS with utility-specific
intercept terms yields estimates of the P's that are numerically equivalent to
subtracting the utility-specific means of each y and x variable from their
observed values, and then doing OLS on this deviation-from-utility mean-
transformed data.12
Second, use of such a deviation from mean estimation procedure results
in relying completely on the "within-utility" sample variance of the x's and
y's to estimate P (but not the ai)
, 
and therefore results in 4 estimates that
entirely ignore the between-utility variance. In our context, this complete
reliance on within-utility variance could be somewhat detrimental, since as
noted earlier, about 78% of our sample variance in NSAR is across utilities,
and only 22% is within utilities over time. By contrast, the random effects
estimator employs both between and within variance in estimating the '6s.13
Note also that use of the fixed effects estimator requires the estimation of
an additional N-1 utility-specific parameters (almost 100 here) when compared
to the random effects specification.
Third, under traditional assumptions, the fixed and random effects
estimators are asymptotically equivalent. To understand this equivalence,
note from Eq. (5) that the fixed effects estimator is equivalent to setting wi
- i. Since s2 and s2 are both strictly positive, wi approaches unity with
increasing Ti, because the denominator in square brackets in Eq. (5) converges
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to infinity. In our sample, while Nt is almost 100, Ti is never larger than
ten and sometimes is as small as one. Evidence from Monte Carlo studies,
presented in Baltagi [1981], suggests that in finite samples (in his case, Ti
- 10) the fixed effects estimators have much greater variance. Thus we
believe that caution should be exercised in using large sample assumptions for
Ti to rationalize results based on the fixed effects estimator.14
Fourth, in the fixed effects specification, the utility-specific
intercept terms can be interpreted as ai - a + vi . Since the sum of all
residuals from econometric estimation is zero, the utility-specific vi thus
essentially reflect the mean of that utility's residuals over its Ti
observations. If the mean of these Ti residuals is large and positive
(negative), then in this framework the impacts of management on LNSAR results
in higher (lower) rates than the average; but if the mean of these Ti
residuals is small and statistically insignificantly different from zero, then
there is no evidence supporting above- or below-average management impacts.
The above discussion on fixed and random effect estimators is based on
the assumption that none of the x's is correlated with the E's. If, for
example, simultaneous equations considerations suggest that use per customer
or average fuel price might be endogenous, then to obtain consistent
estimates, one would want to modify both the fixed and random effect
estimators, employing, for example, an instrumental variable approach.15
These econometric considerations suggest to us a hybrid approach in
estimating management effects on NSAR. Since inclusion of utility-specific
intercepts consumes valuable degrees of freedom, we will employ a compromise
of the fixed and random effects approaches, using a fixed effects (utility-
specific intercepts) specification for observations on the three California
utilities, and a parsimonious in parameters random effects specification for
observations on the remaining 96 non-California utilities in our sample. 16
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This hybrid specification allows us to test for the existence of a "California
effect", yet does not overly parameterize the model. To test whether there is
a "California effect" (in which, controlling for other factors, the California
utilities are examined for whether their NSARs differ from the national
average), we will test the joint null hypothesis that the three intercept
terms of SDG&E, PG&E and SCE are simultaneously equal to zero. We will,
however, also undertake a number of specification and diagnostic tests, and
assess whether estimates and inference concerning the existence of any
"California effect" are robust to alternative estimation methods.17
IV. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
We begin with results from the most simple specification where we
estimate by OLS a model in which in addition to the explanatory variables
discussed above, the three California utilities have separate dummy variables;
results are given in the first column of Table 2. As is seen there, the
parameter estimates on the three California utilities are negative for SDG&E
and SCE, positive for PG&E, but the small t-values imply that each is
insignificantly different from zero. A joint F-test that the three California
utility coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero is not rejected -- the
test statistic is 1.12, while the 0.05 critical value is 2.60.
Several other results from this most basic model are also worth noting.
First, the estimate of the LUPC coefficient is -0.39 and significant, implying
that the elasticity of NSAR with respect to use per customer is about -0.4.
Second, while the impact of ROR on LNSAR is positive and significant as
expected, the coefficient on DLUPC (deviation from trend) is negative, as
expected, although not very reliably so. Third, coefficient estimates on the
generation capacity variables (interpreted as relative to coal) are
signfiicantly positive for oil, gas and nuclear, and negative for hydro.
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TABLE 2
PARAMETER ESTIMATES BASED ON ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS
(Absolute value of ratio of parameter estimate to standard error in parentheses)
RANDOM FIXED
EFFECTS EFFECTS 2SLS
IV-RANDOM
EFFECTS
BETWEEN
ESTIMATOR
CONSTANT 7.108 7.735
(36.64) (17.87)
LUPC
ROR
DLUPC
-0.390 -0.513
(21.69) (12.42)
0.652
(6.62)
-0.224
(1.52)
CAPOTH -0.020
(0.44)
CAPO
CAPG
CAPH
CAPN
LAGE
LCD
LRFUEL
LRWPP
TREND
SDG&E
0.164
(5.78)
0.101
(5.40)
-0.213
(4.30)
0.465
(13.06)
-0.252
(9.92)
0.024
(6.83)
0.180
(11.70)
0.034
(5.85)
-0.013
(6.91)
-0.051
(1.26)
0.455
(7.19)
-0.048
(0.54)
0.029
(0.46)
0.127
(4.42)
0.095
(3.85)
-0.373
(3.89)
0.339
(6.90)
-0.102
(4.90)
0.018
(2.15)
0.096
(8.22)
0.019
(4.51)
-0.022
(15.28)
-0.027
(0.74)
VARIABLE OLS
13.806
(13.34)
-1.025
(10.41)
0.394
(6.34)
0.452
(3.66)
0.042
(0.61)
0.102
(3.37)
0.075
(2.73)
-0.694
(3.75)
0.229
(4.10)
-0.073
(3.55)
-0.224
(5.45)
0.095
(8.06)
0.017
(4.13)
-0.013
(6.87)
-0.021
(0.27)
6.955
(14.34)
-0.375
(7.72)
0.651
(6.61)
-0.242
(1.54)
-0.010
(0.19)
0.172
(4.76)
0.099
(5.15)
-0.212
(4.27)
0.469
(12.54)
-0.252
(9.88)
0.024
(6.46)
0.182
(11.08)
0.035
(5.86)
-0.013
(6.90)
-0.043
(0.89)
7.445
(19.63)
-0.482
(13.34)
0.463
(7.17)
-0.082
(0.91)
0.027
(0.44)
0.135
(4.75)
0.101
(4.17)
-0.363
(4.26)
0.355
(7.45)
-0.109
(5.21)
0.021
(2.99)
0.100
(8.48)
0.020
(4.56)
-0.022
(15.27)
-0.019
(0.58)
7.331
(13.04)
-0.372
(7.38)
0.800
(1.61)
-1.817
(0.45)
0.020
(0.14)
0.105
(1.02)
0.065
(1.18)
-0.094(0.55)
0.530(4.85)
-0.312
(3.34)
0.020
(2.01)
0.247
(3.89)
0.049
(2.08)
-0.007
(0.57)
-0.079
(0.68)
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PG&E 0.038 0.056 -0.163 0.045 0.064 0.011
(0.92) (1.53) (2.99) (0.98) (1.88) (0.09)
SCE -0.030 -0.007 -0.117 -0.024 -0.002 -0.048
(0.76) (0.24) (3.02) (0.54) (0.08) (0.42)
OTHER
DUMMIES None None Yes None Yes No
R2  0.836 0.809 0.962 0.822 0.771 0.861
Fourth, the remaining variables have the expected signs -- positive for LCD,
LRFUEL and LRWPP, and negative for LAGE and TREND.
With this as background, we now turn to estimates based on the hybrid
random effects specification for the 96 non-California utilities, with dummy
variables included for just the California utilities; results are given in the
column with heading "random effects". Qualitatively, the results are quite
similar to those based on OLS. In particular, again the SDG&E and SCE
coefficients are negative but insignificantly different from zero, while that
on PG&E is positive but insignificant. The joint F-statistic for the null
hypothesis that there is no "California effect" is 1.76, while the 0.05
critical value is 2.60, again implying that when other factors are taken into
account, there is no evidence suggesting that California utilities charge
rates different from the national average. With respect to the other
explanatory variables, the random effect LUPC elasticity estimate is slightly
larger in absolute value than with OLS (-0.51 vs. -0.39), while the ROR
estimate is somewhat smaller (0.46 vs. 0.65). The random effects parameter
estimates on the other explanatory variables are similar to those based on
OLS, although some of the insignificant parameters change in sign.
For the random effects specification, one can compute p = s2Y
(s2 + s ) -- the proportion of the total residual variance reflecting
utility-specific "between" variation. Rearranging this relationship and
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solving for s2, then substituting into Eq. (5), yields an expression
relating the Fuller-Battese transformation factor wi to p and Ti. Using the
iterated Fuller-Battese random effects procedure, our estimate of p is 0.748,
with an asymptotic standard error estimate of 0.01. This implies that for an
average sample utility (having 8.87 annual observations), the Fuller-Battese
transformation factor wi in Eq. (5) is 0.83. Finally, as a check on the
normality assumption, we calculated a Shapiro-Wilks test statistic for
normality of the residuals; the test statistic was 0.9839, which has a p-value
of 0.1561, thereby lending support to the normality assumption.
As discussed in Section III, an alternative estimation procedure is the
fixed effects estimator that restricts wi to 1.00. Estimates of our model
based on the fixed effects estimator are given in the middle column of Table
2. The fixed effect model has been specified so that sample size-weighted
estimates of the utility-specific dummy variable coefficients sum to zero
across all utilities, implying that each of the dummy variable parameters
should be interpreted as differences from a national average. All three
California utilities have negative coefficient estimates, with those of SCE &
PG&E reaching statistical significance. If true, these results would suggest
that holding other factors constant, California utilities have lower system
average rates than does the hypothetical "national average utility".
If vi is correlated with any of the x's, then although the fixed effects
estimator is consistent (and in some cases efficient), the random effects
estimator is not consistent. One situation where this might occur is if vi is
envisaged as reflecting the impact of omitted variables, and if one or more of
the omitted variables are correlated with the included variables. A large-
sample specification test for testing whether vi and the x's are uncorrelated
has been developed by Hausman [1978] and elaborated on by Hausman-Taylor
[1981]. In essence, it amounts to testing whether the fixed and random
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effects estimators yield estimates of the P's that are statistically
insignificantly different from each other. Although results from such a
Hausman test suggest a statistically significant difference between the fixed
and random effects estimates at better than the 5% level, thereby favoring the
fixed effects estimator, the fixed effects results appear less plausible on
economic grounds.
For example, the fixed effect estimated elasticity of system average
rate with respect to use per customer is -1.025 -- an estimate we believe is
unrealistically large given the substantial fraction of a typical utility's
variable costs in its total costs. Also, rather than having the expected
negative sign, the estimated coefficient on DLUPC in the fixed effects model
is positive and significant; similarly, while one expects customer density to
have a positive impact on system average rate, the fixed effect parameter
estimate on LCD is negative and significant.
An alternative consistent estimator when vi is correlated with one of
the regressors involves use of an instrumental variable (IV) procedure. Given
the large observed difference between the fixed and random effect coefficient
on LUPC, we focus particular attention on the possible correlation of vi with
LUPC. We therefore re-estimate the OLS and random effect models with LUPC
"instrumented" using the logarithm of cooling degree days. Results are given
in columns 4 and 5, respectively, of Table 2. Again we obtain the robust
finding that none of the California utilities has a significant positive
coefficient estimate; for both 2SLS and IV-Random Effects, the SDG&E and SCE
effect estimates are negative and insignificant, while that for PG&E is
positive but insignificant. Moreover, the IV-Random Effects estimates on the
model's explanatory variables are very similar to the random effects estimates
that do not take the possible correlation of vi and LUPC into account.18 The
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absence of any statistically significant "California effect" is therefore
quite robust.
To assess this robustness further, we have examined a number of other
model specifications. For example, we estimated models in which variables
such as underground distribution lines, sulfur controls, sulfur emissions,
state wage rate, percent residential customers and load factor were added
separately or in combination; not only were coefficients on these variables
statistically insignificantly different from zero, but estimates of the three
"California effect" parameters remained insignificant. We also estimated a
model in which the LRFUEL variable was instrumented using the state's average
fuel cost; again, the estimated "California effects" were insignificant. 19
Another diagnostic we examined concerned choice of functional form. To
compare our logarithmic specification with a linear one, it is of course
inappropriate to compare their R2 values, since the dependent variables
differ. To do a meaningful "head-to-head" comparison, we compared the linear
and log models by calculating an R2 in levels. In this case, the model with
the higher constructed R2 is preferred. We first estimated the model with all
variables in their linear form, using the iterated Fuller-Battese procedure;
the R2 from this model (based on the original data) was 0.6129. We then
compared these results with those based on the random effects model of Table
2. In particular, we computed the fitted value of LNSAR, converted it to NSAR
by exponentiating it, and then obtained an unbiased estimate of the fitted
NSAR by multiplying by exp(.5s 2), where s2 is the estimated residual variance.
Finally, we calculated an R2 value by calculating the ratio of the sample
variance of the unbiased prediction to the sample variance of net price. 20
The resulting R2 value was 0.7548, which is larger than the linear R2 of
0.6129, providing strong evidence that the logarithmic model is the preferred
specification for analyzing net price. 21
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Yet another check on robustness involves use of what is commonly called
a "between" estimator. It is of course well-known that in balanced panels the
random effects estimator is a weighted average of the fixed effect "within"
estimator and a between estimator, where the between estimation involves
computing sample means of all variables for each utility, and then (in our
context) running a regression of each utility's mean LNSAR on the sample means
of the explanatory variables.22 This suggests the following mental exercise.
Suppose one collects sample means over 1984-93 annual observations of the
left- and right-hand variables for each of the 96 non-California utilities,
and then runs an OLS regression. Given the resulting parameter estimates
based on only the non-California utilities, use the sample means of the
explanatory variables for SDG&E, SCE and PG&E to generate predicted LNSARs for
these utilities, and then prediction errors by subtracting the predicted LNSAR
from the three utilities' mean actual LNSAR. Then test whether these
prediction errors are statistically significantly different from zero.
The above exercise is numerically equivalent to running the same between
regression, but adding dummy variables for each of the three California
utilities, including these utilities in the estimation, and then testing
whether the dummy variable coefficients for the three utilities are
statistically significantly different from zero.23 Results from such an
exercise are given in the final column of Table 2. As is seen there, again
one finds that the estimated California effects for SDG&E and SCE are negative
and insignificant, while that for PG&E is positive but insignificant. We
conclude, therefore, that once one controls for various regional, economic and
regulatory factors, there is no evidence supporting the notion that the
performance of California utilities is worse than the national average
benchmark.
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V. IMPLICATIONS AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS
The results reported in the previous section are surprisingly robust.
The common theme of these results is that once one controls for various
regional, economic and regulatory factors outside the direct and immediate
control of utility management, system average rates charged by the California
utilities are not statistically different from the national average. An
important issue raised by these results, however, concerns the interpretation
of why it is that the unadjusted rates are so much higher in California than
in the rest of the country. What insights can our estimated model provide in
helping us understand what accounts for California's higher unadjusted system
average rates?
One way of interpreting California's relatively high rates is to proceed
as follows. Suppose a California utility had values of the various regional,
economic and regulatory variables equal to those of the national average. In
such a hypothetical case, what would that California utility's system average
rate be, and how much of the difference between its actual and hypothetical
rates could be attributed to each of the various explanatory variables?
We have undertaken such a calculation, based on parameter estimates from
the random effects specification, and illustrate its results for SDG&E in
Table 3.24 As is seen there, while the 1984-93 national system average rate
is 8.02C per Kwh (in 1993 constant dollars), that for SDG&E is 4.85C higher at
12.870/Kwh. Of this 4.85U difference, 3.06¢ (about 63%) can be attributed to
the fact that SDG&E has a use per customer equal to about half the national
average, and another 0.73C (about 15%) reflects the fact that SDG&E's
generation mix involves more gas, oil and nuclear than the national average,
and less hydro and coal. Together, differential use per customer and
generation mix account for about 78% (3.79 of the 4.85t) of the discrepancy
between SDG&E and the national average system electricity rate. Higher
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TABLE 3
DECOMPOSING THE SDG&E AVERAGE ELECTRICITY PRICE DIFFERENCE
FROM THE NATIONAL AVERAGE
Average Electricity Price (1984-93)
(C/Kwh in 1993 constant dollars)
SDG&E 12.87
National Average 8.02
Difference 4.85
Decomposition of the Difference
C/Kwh
Lower Electricity Use per Customer 3.06
Generation Mix 0.73
Higher Average Fuel Price 0.41
Younger Age of System 0.25
Higher Franchise Fees 0.24
Higher Customer Density 0.19
Higher Demand-Side Management Expenditures 0.07
Higher Cost of Utility Purchased Power 0.06
Time Trend 0.04
Higher Rate of Return 0.03
Expenditures for QF Power 0.00
Lower State and Local Taxes -0.14
Remaining Influence of the Above Factors
Not Separately Measurable 0.12
SDG&E Effect (Not Statistically Significant) -0.21
TOTAL 4.85
% Difference
63.1%
15.1
8.5
5.2
4.9
3.9
1.4
1.2
0.8
0.6
0.0
-2.9
2.5
-4.3
100.0%
average fuel price, younger age of system, higher franchise fees, and higher
customer density together account for another 1.09( (about 22%) of the
difference, while the remaining factors essentially cancel one another out.25
Finally, note that the SDG&E effect -- the effect of SDG&E management on
system average rate -- is slightly negative, -0.21C/Kwh -- implying that
ceteris paribus, SDG&E's prices are slightly lower than the national average.
From a statistical standpoint, however, this estimated SDG&E effect is not
reliably different from zero.
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The above decomposition was based on parameters from the random effects
specification in Table 2. Alternative calculations could be done using
parameters from other models; in all cases except for that of the fixed
effects model, however, the qualitative findings regarding the factors
underlying SDG&E's higher average electricity prices would be largely
unchanged. Since the parameter estimate on LUPC is so very large and negative
with fixed effects, a decomposition based on those estimates would suggest an
even larger role for use per customer. However, as noted in the previous
section, given our relatively small time series in the panel data, as well as
some of the implausible parameter estimates obtained from the fixed effects
estimates, we tend not to treat the fixed effects results as being reliable.
But even with fixed effects parameters, the SDG&E effect would not be
significantly different from zero.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Using multiple regression methods, we have undertaken a statistical
"benchmark" study comparing system average electricity rates charged by three
California utilities with 96 other US utilities over the 1984-93 time period.
Although system average electricity rates are much higher in California than
for the national average, we conclude that use of such unadjusted prices
provides no meaningful information on how one evaluates the performance of
utility management. Rather, we find that average electricity prices are
affected to a large extent by a number of factors outside direct and immediate
management control, such as local costs of doing business, the availability of
low-cost generation sources (e.g., hydro and coal), customer and service
territory characteristics such as customer density, use per customer, and a
number of regulatory and environmental factors. Once one controls for these
various factors, the remaining impact of utility management on system average
rates is rather modest, and for the California utilities the impact of utility
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management (relative to the national average) is insignificantly different
from zero. This finding of no difference in prices, holding constant the
effects of factors outside of California utilities' control, is robust, being
sustained in a large number of alternative models and estimation methods.
It would of course be desirable to decompose further the reasons for
differences in system average rates. One possible line of research could
examine distinct cost categories such as generation, transmission and
distribution, or even a further disaggregation of these functions. Although
of great interest, such a study would impose very challenging difficulties to
any empirical researcher. The most obvious difficulty is the problem of
obtaining reliable time series of disaggregated cost data that is comparable
across utilities. The accounting procedures by which utilities allocate fixed
and common costs to functional activities vary even between the all-electric
utilities, are considerably more complex and idiosyncratic for combined gas-
electric utilities, and probably have varied over time for all utilities as
well. It is worth emphasizing that in capital-intensive industries such as
electric utilities, how one measures fixed costs presents important
difficulties, and we suspect that reliable conclusions that are robust to
alternative accounting conventions would be difficult to obtain.
There are, however, a number of useful extensions of this research.
Within the electric utility context, one might also want to take into account
variations in the "quality" of electricity, such as the system reliability and
average duration of any downtime. 26 More generally, the approach taken in
this paper could in principle be applied to other industries, not only
partially regulated ones such as natural gas and telecommunications, but also
to firms in various deregulated industries.
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FOOTNOTES
iThe methodology of our "bottom line" statistical benchmark study differs of
course from benchmark studies that focus on a much more disaggregated,
detailed and homogeneous operational or functional level of analysis.
2We selected the 1984-93 time period since public data were not generally
available in electronic format prior to 1984.
3We employ the BLS regional CPIs for the Northeast, South, North Central and
West. Although the BLS publishes CPIs for selected metropolitan areas, the
metropolitan CPIs do not cover all utilities in our sample; moreover, the BLS
advises that the metropolitan-level data may not be as reliable as the
regional data. It is worth noting that use of a regional CPI captures
differential rates of price change across regions, but it does not incorporate
regional differentials in price levels.
4Since all investor-owned utilities face the same federal statutory tax rates
and provisions, we do not net out federal tax payments.
5The coal capacity indicated for SCE reflects partial ownership of coal
generation facilities in Arizona. There is no coal generation capacity within
California.
6Industrial users often receive services from high-voltage transmission lines,
whereas residential users require service from low-voltage distribution lines
that transform power to levels acceptable for home use. Thus it is reasonable
to posit that NSAR and share of residential customers are positively related.
7Since these percentages sum to 100% for each utility each year, they are not
independent; we drop the coal share, and thus regression coefficients should
be interpreted as relative to coal.
8For the moment, assume that E(vivj) - 0 for i7 j, E(Eitejs) - 0 for sft or
ifj, and that E(eituj ) - 0 for all i, t and j.
9Our interpretation of this error component model builds on the work of Hoch
[1955], Mundlak [1961] and Griliches [1957]. These writers were particularly
interested in obtaining estimates of the #'s (in their contexts, typically
estimates of Cobb-Douglas production function parameters based on farm outputs
and inputs data) that were not biased because of a failure to take management
impacts into account. While these researchers focussed on consistent
estimates of the P's, here we use their approach but instead focus more of our
attention on obtaining consistent estimates of the management effects. For a
review of this literature, see Chamberlain [1984].
10This transformation is due to Wayne Fuller and George Battese [1973,1974].
110n this, see Badi Baltagi and Qi Li [1992], and Trevor Breusch [1987].
Notice that the traditional concept of a likelihood function whose sample
magnitude is to be maximized becomes quite unclear when the panel is
unbalanced, since the disturbance vector has random length.
12 See, for example, Greene [1993, Chapter 16].
13For a clear exposition of this point, see Yair Mundlak [1978].
PAGE - 27 -
BENCHMARK STUDY OF SYSTEM AVERAGE ELECTRICITY RATES
14Results of Monte Carlo studies have also been reported in Baltaji-Rak [1992]
and Taylor [1980], but all these studies typically focus their attention on
small sample estimates of the P's, not of the ai's.
15A discussion of estimation issues for error components models in the context
of simultaneous equations is found in, inter alia, Baltagi-Raj [1992, pp.91-
94].
16To do this, we employ the Fuller-Battese transformation for all observations
other than those involving the three California utilities, and introduce
indicator variables for the three California utilities, whose data are not
transformed with the Fuller-Battese procedure.
17We also considered employing a more time-series oriented stochastic
specification, such as one involving an ARMA process. While feasible in the
context of balanced panels (see, for example, Galbraith and Zinde-Walsh
[1995]), in our situation with missing observations and an unbalanced panel,
there would be a very substantial decrease in the number of observations
available for efficient estimation.
18It is worth noting that the weather cooling degree days variable performs
very well as an instrument; its t-value in the first-stage regression was
11.72.
19We also undertook an analysis in which we instrumented the ROR variable
using Moody's bond rating categories. Although this increased the size of the
coefficient on the ROR variable, again each of the dummy variable coefficients
on the three California utilities was insignificantly different from zero
(point estimates for SDG&E and SCE were negative, while that for PG&E was
positive).
20For a discussion, see fn. 16, p. 144 in Berndt [1991], which in turn is
based on Aitchison and Brown [1966].
21It is worth noting that with the linear specification, occasionally some of
the California utilities had a positive and significant "California" effect.
Such findings are not reliable, however, since the linear specification is
clearly dominated by the logarithmic model.
22See Green [1993, Chapter 16] for details and references.
23This occurs since the fitted and actual values are identical (the residual
is zero) when each additional parameter is unique to the additional utility
observation. For discussion, see Berndt [1991, Exercise 7, pp. 48-50]. It
should also be noted that in the context of an unbalanced panel such as ours,
both equations are estimated weighting each utility by Ti.
24To do this with a logarithmic specification, one must allocate the linear
and joint multiplicative effects on price, and compute partial effects by
evaluating at the sample means of the other variables. This involves use of
Taylor's series approximations. Details of the procedures we employed are
given in a technical appendix available from the authors upon request.
25The non-zero impact of time trend reflects the fact that data for all three
California utilities were available for the entire ten-year time period,
whereas the "average utility" was observed 8.87 years.
26For analyses of reliability in the electric utility industry, see, inter
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alia, Doane, Hartman and Woo [1988a,b], Grosfeld-Nir and Tishler [1993], and
Woo and Train [1989].
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